RACE NUISANCE : THE POLITICS OF LAW
IN THE JIM CROW ERA
Rachel D. Godsil
Abstract
This article explores a startling and previously unnoticed line of cases
in which state courts in the Jim Crow era ruled against white plaintiffs trying to
use common law nuisance doctrine to achieve residential segregation. These
“race-nuisance” cases complicate the view of most legal scholarship that state
courts during the Jim Crow era openly eschewed the rule of law in service of
white supremacy. Instead, the cases provide rich social historical detail
showing southern judges wrestling with their competing allegiance to precedent
and the white plaintiffs’ pursuit of racial exclusivity. Surprisingly to many in
the academy, the allegiance to precedent generally prevailed.
The cases confound prevailing legal theories, particularly new
formalism and critical race theory’s interest convergence. While new
formalists may at first see these cases as supportive of their claims, the Article
illustrates the limitations of formalism’s reach by also exploring the related line
of racially restrictive covenant cases. Similarly, while interest convergence
scholars might attempt to read many of the cases as supporting white property
owners’ interests, this Article demonstrates that the race-nuisance cases are
better understood as demonstrating that white interests are multi-faceted.
Interest convergence is therefore a useful way to explain unexpected outcomes
but not to predict such outcomes. In sum, the article casts substantial doubt on
the background assumptions about the way law worked during the Jim Crow
era, and thus provides a more textured understanding of that period.
The article also derives important insights into the present from the
race-nuisance and related cases. These insights offer both optimism for those
concerned about racial liberation, but also realism about the limits of the law.
First, common law doctrine may be a potentially powerful vehicle for people of
color and other disenfranchised groups since courts in the United States do not
lightly disassociate themselves from common law precedent or operative legal
norms and ideals. Second, the fact that white interests are not as monolithic as
often presumed offers potential for strategic alliances that may significantly
influence opportunities for success – both legal and political. Lastly, and less
hopefully, legal norms do not easily and always translate into social practice.
Any hope for lasting change will be accomplished only by social and political
movements.
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RACE NUISANCE : THE POLITICS OF LAW
IN THE JIM CROW ERA
Rachel D. Godsil*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1883, a white family brought a law suit in state court claiming
that a black family moving in next door would be a nuisance. The case,
Falloon v. Schilling, was litigated to the Kansas Supreme Supreme
Court, which issued a unanimous decision.2 This decision formed the
precedent for 28 more such cases brought during the Jim Crow era in
other state courts. Most cases were in the south, Louisianna, Mississippi,
Texas, Tennessee, but a few families brought what I call “race-nuisance”
cases in the north as well. When I recount this story to my students,
other law professors, and even non-lawyers, the vast majority assume
that I am describing yet another instance of racist state courts warping
doctrine in favor of white supremecy. The story’s conclusion suprises
my listeners: in most cases, the white plaintiffs lost.3
Many current scholars presume that “Jim Crow” 4 courts
eschewed the rule of law, openly treating Black people as unworthy of
legal protection.5 Articles addressing Jim Crow describe countless

*Professor

of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D. University of Michigan
Law School, 1992. I would like to thank participants in the American Association of
Law Schools Mid-Year Property Conference, the Georgetown Environmental Research
Series, and the 2005 Property, Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurism, and the Seton
Hall Summer Colloquium for invaluable critiques and suggestions. I would also like to
thank Kathleen Boozang, Carl Coleman, Richard Delgado, Jim Freeman, Tristin Green,
Don Herzog, Solangel Maldonado, Denise Morgan, Kwesi Prempeh, and Charlie
Sullivan for their critical suggestions on various drafts, as well as Marisol Cordero, Ed
Kowalis, Amanda Kelly and Derek Nececkas for their truly superb research assistance.
Seton Hall School of Law assisted this project with a summer research grant.
2 29 Kan. 292 (1883).
3 Few legal scholars have referenced the existence of white challenges to black people
using common law nuisance and no one has yet analyzed the decisions. See Carol
Rose, The Story of Shelley v. Kraemer in PROPERTY STORIES 173 (Gerald Korngold and
Andrew P. Morriss eds.) (2004); John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY
L.J. 265, 319 (2001).
4 The term “Jim Crow” was originally popularized in the 1830s by a white minstrel,
Thomas “Daddy” Rice. Donning “black face” and attired in beggar’s clothes, Rice
performed a routine he called “Jump Jim Crow,” in which he imitated an elderly and
crippled Black man owned by a Mr. Crow: “Weel about, and turn about / And do jis
so; /Eb’ry time I weel about,/ I jump Jim Crow.” Historians have not determined how
Jim Crow came be synonomous with racial segregation. LEON LITWACK, TROUBLE IN
MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998).
5 See e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE PIG FARMER’S DAUGHER AND OTHER TALES
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865

2

incidents of state courts’ differential treatment of Blacks, and many court
opinions contain blatantly racist language.6 Needless to say, the Jim
Crow era was replete with such behavior. However, the race nuisance
cases complicate this view. Instead of the picture we expect, the cases
show southern judges wrestling with their competing allegiance to
precedent and the white plaintiffs’ pursuit of racial exclusivity.
In these cases at least, the judges did not reflexively and
consistently rule against Black people and for white plaintiffs in all
cases. In light of the underlying racism of this era, this article explores
multiple legal theories in search of an explanation: legal formalism,7
property theory,8 and critical race theory.9 Each sheds light on aspects of
judicial decisionmaking in these cases – but ultimately, none
satisfactorily explains the entire picture.
My goal in this Article is, to use Randall Kennedy’s words, to
“confront the full, complicated vastness”10 of this particular history,
rather then viewing it as an alien caricature supporting a particular
scholarly view. The value of these cases lies in their details and
specificity. The details allow us then to critique and complicate the onesize-fits all theories so common in legal scholarship.11
When we look closely, we observe some southern state courts
yielding to precedent, relying upon stated norms of equal treatment and
race neutrality, and reaching outcomes obverse to white plaintiffs. A
TO THE PRESENT 91 (2000); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South
African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990); cf.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 81 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter
KLARMAN, JIM CROW].
6 See infra notes --.
7 Others will contend from a different political perspective that the cases illustrate the
potency of what David Bernstein calls “traditional jurisprudence” or legal formalism.
See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL
(2001). The Jim Crow judges were reflexive formalists for whom race was not always
as salient as is often assumed.
8 Scholars including most recently Michael Klarman have argued that concern for
private property rights transcends even its concomminant racism: in other words,
property trumps. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 81
9 A critical race theorist would likely read the cases as an example of Derrick Bell’s
(2004).
white interest convergence. According to this view, the cases likely reaffirm broader
white interests. Obviously, the fact that white plaintiffs lost does not necessarily
guarantee that the interests of white elites were not furthered by the cases. See Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518 (1980).
10 Randall Kennedy, Race Relations and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 n.36 (1986).
11 Legal historians often critique what they refer to as “law-office history” – which is
the practice of using historical facts selectively to support a predetermined normative
position. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 119, 122 n.13.
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“new formalist” might use these cases as evidence of both the normative
value and the prevalence of formalist decisionmaking. I argue, however,
that the race nuisance cases cannot be fully explained by formalist
decisionmaking and, more significantly, that the related line of cases
concerning racial zoning and the enforceability of racially restrictive
covenants show the limits to formalism in some racially charged cases.
State courts were split on the constitutionality of racial zoning cases and
all southern courts and most northern courts with significant Black
populations enforced restrictive covenants, while some western and
northern courts did not.12
In other words, during the same period that courts were adhering
to nuisance precedent to rule against whites seeking to exclude
individual Black families or institutions from locating in their neighborhoods, courts were also twisting precedent to uphold the enforceability
of racially restrictive covenants. The challenge for formalism is then to
explain the difference between the two sets of cases.
Some scholars have suggested that our national commitment to
property rights dictated the outcome of property disputes even when race
was involved. This use of property explains divergent decisions in the
property area without upsetting our general assumption that white
inter ests always prevail. The problem with this argument is that in most
property disputes, both parties will have a property interest at stake. In
the nuisance context, the plaintiff is seeking to protect her interest in her
enjoyment of her land, while the defendant is defending his use of his
land. Both are “sticks” in the property “bundle.” Similarly, in racially
restrictive covenant cases, the plaintiff will be a property owner with an
interest in enforcing a covenant which presumably bolsters her property
value, while the defendant will be a current or prospective property
owner seeking the right to alienate or purchase property. Both are
property interests which courts have in other contexts gone far to protect.
Therefore, the simple assertion that property trumps often made by
scholars trying to explain decisions involving race and property that
don’t favor the white party fails to tell us anything helpful.
While a simplistic recitation of the importance of property does
not explain much, property theory from this period is more enlightening.
Recent scholarship reasserting a natural-law theory of property suggests
that in the pre-20th century legal regime, a physical-invasion theory of
property created a strong presumption in favor of free use of land unless
one’s use resulted in a physical invasion of another’s property.13 This
argument helps establish a theoretical baseline for the race-nuisance
cases. This theory, however, does not explain why race did not become
one of the many exceptions to this general trend. Courts created
12

Id.
See Eric Claeyes, Jefferson Meets Coase: Train Sparks, Natural Rights, and Law
and Economics (draft on file with author).
13
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exceptions for funeral homes, “bawdy” houses, and certain other uses
that did not cause a physical invasion of another’s land, but upset certain
norms of order and morality. It was certainly conceivable that race
might have become one of those exceptions.
Instead, there appears to have been some commitment to the
norm of race neutrality or equal treatment – even in state courts during
Jim Crow. In response to the “Black Codes” that proliferated in the
post-Civil War South, the Reconstruction Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which provided to all persons regardless of race “the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”14
The first race-nuisance decision seems to have tracked the Civil
Rights Act and the ideals underlying its passage. The Court stated:
Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or
offensive. A negro family is not, per se, a nuisance; and a white
family cannot prevent his neighbor from renting his home to a
negro family any more than he can to a German, an Irish or a
French family.15
No court held to the contrary.
A critical race theorist may reply that courts were always seeking
to maximize white interests even when the stated outcome of the case
appeared to favor people of color. One variant of this claim is Derrick
Bell’s well-known theory of interest convergence.16 This story plays out
in the race-nuisance cases because a reasonable number of the race
nuisance cases may have actually buttressed segregation by facilitating
the existence of separate institutions for Blacks. Very few of the racenuisance cases challenged the architecture of segregation. Rather, most
of the cases were brought by white landowners seeking to exclude
segregated institutions17 or white families seeking to house Black
14

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
Falloon, 29 Kan. at 292.
16 Bell, supra note __.
17 Thoenebe v. Mosby, 101 A. 98 (1917); Green v. State ex rel. Chatham, 56 So.2d 12
(1952).; Morrison v. Rawlinson, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940); Fox v. Corbitt, 194 S.W. 88
(1917); Giles v. Rawlings, 97 S.E. 521 (1918); Harty v. Guerra, 269 S.W. 1064 (1925);
Mitchell v. Deisch, 18 S.W.2d 364 (1929); City Council of City and County of Denver
v. United Negroes Protective Ass’n, 76 Colo. 86 (1924); Hall v. Moffett, 170 S.E. 193
(1933); Diggs v. Morgan College, 105 A. 157 (1918); Killian v. British Shalom
Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (1941); Dudley v. City of Charlotte, 27 S.E.2d 732
(1943); Crist v. Henshaw, 163 P.2d 214 (1945); Baptist Church of Madisonville v.
Webb, 178 S.W. 689 (1915); Boyd v. Bd. of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 77
S.W.669 (1903); Spencer Chapel M.E. Church v. Brogan, 231 P. 1074 (1924);
15
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servants on their property.18 Only a few of the cases were brought by
whites trying to exclude individual Blacks of equal status from white
neighborhoods.19
For a segregated society to exist, segregated
institutions had to be located somewhere, and the small Black enclaves
may not have been big enough for cemeteries, hospitals, parks and
sanatoriums. Therefore, the cases in which white plaintiffs were
unsuccessful may simply have been instances in which the interests of a
small number of white landowners were sacrificed for the greater good
of racial segregation.
However, this theory does not explain all the cases. Several of
the cases simply cannot be ascribed to the fulfillment of white
supremacy – a Black funeral director permitted to move into a wealthy
white Memphis neighborhood, a Black man dispensing medicine without
a license to whites and Blacks alike.20 If contrary outcomes to any
dispute can be decided as interest convergence, then it is such a broad
claim that it fails to explain any outcome. Moreover, it eliminates any
agency on the part of the Black litigants.
A close read of these cases also complicates the interest
convergence theory by showing the impossibility of identifying a
universal “white” interest. Instead, the nuisance and related cases
illustrate that white interests are not monolithic. At regular intervals, a
particular outcome would help one group of whites and harm another.
For example, cases involve white people challenging other white
peoples’ attempts to house Black servants on their property.21 We can
say that obviously the dominant class is the group able to hire servants
rather than the group opposing their residence. However, others are not
so easily categorized. Is the dominant class the developer seeking the
right to sell to whoever would purchase, or the developer seeking to
maintain a particular area’s racial exclusivity? Indeed, the cases show
that groups of whites sometimes collaborated with groups of people of
color to seek jointly beneficial goals. The conventional view of white
peoples’ motives and behavior during the Jim Crow era would suggest
the impossibility of these moves.

Lancaster v. Harwood, 245 S.W. 755; Wright v. DeFatta, 142 So.2d 489 (1962); City of
Memphis v. Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548 (1933); Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785 (1954);
Woods v. Kiersky, 14 S.W.2d 825 (1929).
18 Lancaster, 245 S.W. 755; Woods, 14 S.W.2d 825; Young v. St. Martin’s Church, 64
A.2d 814 (1949).
19 Falloon, 29 Kan. 292; Holbrook v. Morrison, 100 N.E. 1111 (1913).
20 These cases undercut any dichotomous distinction between idealism and realism –
neither theory can wholly explain our actions. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 11-14
(1989). Viewing the three sets of cases in detail suggest that ideals sometimes affect
out comes in ways that seem to diverge from interests, but that these same ideals are
often overwhelmed by the pursuit of contrasting interests. Even in the latter scenario,
though, the ideals may set the stage for later progress.
21 Lancaster, 245 S.W. 755; Worm v. Wood, 223 S.W. 1016 (1920).
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While the race-nuisance cases are filled with racist references,
they nonetheless show that as an “ideal,” race neutrality was in play
during this era. As an operative ideal, it may help to explain the
difference in the outcomes and ideals present in the nuisance, zoning and
restrictive covenant cases.
For race to affect the outcome in the
nuisance cases, courts would have had to find expressly that race was
salient to the outcome. The white plaintiffs were asking courtsto make
an affirmative finding that black people as a class were nuisances – akin
to pollution. If courts considered the legal ideals of equal treatment to
have any meaning at all, they precluded such a finding. By contrast, the
racial zoning cases involved courts either invalidating or deferring to legislative decisions about the separation of the races, and the restrictive
covenant cases allowed the judges to see themselves as simply enforcing
private agreements. A court decision labeling Blacks a nuisance would
have been a much more significant deviation from the legal ideal of
equal treatment than a court decision upholding a private covenenant excluding Blacks. 22 The racial zoning cases were more troublesome
because they clearly involved state action – but after Plessy v.
Ferguson,23 simply separating the races had of course been upheld.
Indeed, in the cases upholding racial zoning, the courts often mentioned
the beneficial effects of segregation.
From this rich historical source, we can also derive insight into
the present. Some of these insights offer hope for the role of law in
securing racial liberation. From these opinions, we can conclude that
courts in the United States do not lightly disassociate themselves from
common law precedent or operative legal norms and ideals. Therefore,
legal doctrine and ideals are worth fighting over. The race-nuisance, and
related cases, also shed light on the role of strategic alliances in legal
battles. First, there have always been some in the dominant group who
hold a firm ideological commitment to equality. Perhaps more
importantly, the interests of the dominant classes are not monolithic –
subsets of whites will at different points have more in common with
people of color than with other groups of whites. These instances should
be exploited through the formation of strategic alliances.
These
strategic alliances are age-old – the litigants in Buchanan v. Warley used
them,24 as did those favoring affirmative action in the recent Grutter litigation.25
22

According to formalist or classical legal scholars, most legal disputes “had ‘right’
answers dictated by a small number of relatively abstract principles.’” Stephen A.
Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 1513, 1521. If that were so, one would assume that courts with differing
political views about race and integration would reach the same outcome when deciding
whether the covenants were valid. See infra Part III.C. for a full discussion of the
racially restrictive covenant cases.
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
25 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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However, the fact that cases such as these were decided during
the Jim Crow era should also caution us about the limits of the law. It is
intriguing to anyone interested in the historical development of law that
some judges in the Jim Crow era subscribed – or felt obligated to invoke
– ideals of equal treatment. It is also obvious that this norm did not
translate into social practice. Indeed, the litigants in the cases
themselves may not even have benefited from the legal ideals. There are
limits to relying solely upon legal opinions to deduce any conclusions
about life as it was lived. The white plaintiffs who sought to use
nuisance law to exclude Blacks from their neighborhoods may have
turned to other means to achieve this end once they lost in court. As
Carol Rose has argued:
[O]ur everday lives are filled with instances that call on us to
respect property, even when no policemen or private retaliation
can restrain us: we don’t steal the unlocked and unguarded
bicycle, we don’t pocket the bubble gum when no one is looking,
we live up to our side of a deal, even with a stranger who would
have no easy way to enforce the bargain. A property regime, in
short, depends upon a web of respect, honor, and acceptance that
somehow modifies the immediate appetite for ‘more.’26
Regardless of the outcomes of certain cases, this crucial web of
respect, honor and acceptance of the rights of Blacks to own property
was lacking. Indeed, land ownership often incited violent reprisal by
whites.27 A Savannah Black newspaper reported, “It is getting to be a
dangerous thing, to acquire property, to get an education, to own an
automobile, to dress well, and to build a respectable home.”28 Another
Black newspaper reported, “[n]ot infrequently, successful blacks found
themselves accused of improper relations with a white woman and were
forced to sell their property at a loss and leave town.”29 During a public
debate between two young Black women in Charlotte in 1901 entitled,
“Is the South the Best Home for the Negro?”, Laura Arnold noted: “All
too many blacks . . .had placed their fondest hopes in the security of
property, only to be devastated without notice or reason.”30
The cases do not present a rosy picture of life or law in the Jim
Crow era. They are replete with the racism of the day. Nor do they
undercut the reality of lynchings, violence, and disenfranchisement that
took place during this period. Instead, they illustrate that these social
practices occurred despite a legal system that had somewhat more in
26

Carol Rose, ‘Enough and As Good’ of What?, 81 N.W.U.L.R. 417, 438 (1987).
Despite formidable obstacles, by 1910, Blacks acquired fifteen million acres of land
in southern states. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through
Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 505, 526 (2001).
28 Id. at 153.
29 Id.
30 Id.
27
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common with our own than we like to remember. As importantly, the
cases introduce us to people who challenged the white supremacist status
quo during its ascendance – and prevailed.
This article begins with a detailed description of the racenuisance cases. I divide the cases into the “mere presence”31 cases, in
which white landowners argued that the presence of certain racial
minorities interfered with their use and enjoyment of land, and the
“conduct” cases, in which whites contended that the particular uses of
land by these same groups resulted in common law nuisances. Part II
examines
competing jurisprudential theories formalism, property
theory, and critical race theory, and the related linen of cases involving
racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants. This Part concludes that
each is useful in understanding the outcomes of the race-nuisance cases,
but none sufficient. Part III offers a series of insights into the present
from the race-nuisance and related cases.
II.

RACE AND NUISANCE IN THE COURTS

Conventional wisdom would predict during the worst of the Jim
Crow era, white plaintiffs would have been able to use nuisance doctrine
successfully to challenge the presence of Black people in white
neighborhoods. Nuisance doctrine during this era was an elastic concept
that formally at least precluded any use of land that would cause
annoyance to adjacent landowners.32 The presence of Black people
would undoubtedly have caused such annoyance to the many racist and
segregationist whites of this era. The first two decades of the 20th
century saw waves of pseudo science supporting notions of Black
inferiority that cemented racist attitudes and supported the need to
segregate the races.33 According to historian George Fredrickson, whites
began to conclude that there was a need to “segregate or quarantine a
race liable to be a source of contamination and social danger to the white
comm
unity, as it sank even deeper into the slough of disease, vice and

31

Nagle, supra note __, at 275 (noting that some neighbors complained of the “mere
presence” of an unmarried couple and African-American family).
32 See, e.g., Carol Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 273 (Rose notes that “late
nineteenth and early twentieth century American states increasingly recognized rights
of action for nuisance against landowners who caused undue smoke, fumes, noise,
water pollution, and even loss of light and air”, but also cites cases involving the
breeding of mares and stallions within the sight and hearing of a dwelling).
33 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
DUKE L.J. 624, 651-56 (1985) (Hovenkamp explores the science and social science
racial inferiority theories of the late 19th and early 20th century and concludes that the
science of the day created a great fear of the social costs of racial mixing, prompting
segregation legislation); Schmitt, supra note __ at 453.
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criminality.”34 The white plaintiffs in the race nuisance cases sought to
enshrine these views into law in the race nuisance cases.
This Part surveys the race nuisance cases in detail. I have
identified 28 reported appellate decisions in which white homeowners or
municipal governments sought to use nuisance doctrine to preclude the
use of land by Blacks or other racial minorities. The first section
describes those cases in which white homeowners claimed that the “mere
presence” of racial minorities constituted a nuisance. These cases were
uniformly unsuccessful. The second section describes cases in which
white homeowners or municipal governments challenged certain conduct
occurring on the land by Blacks or other racial minorities. The results
are significantly more mixed in these cases. Because few readers are
likely to be familiar with the cases, this Part is intended to be descriptive
and not analytical.35 I explain my conclusions and impressions from the
cases in Parts IV and V.
A.

Overview of Nuisance Doctrine

Nuisance law was in the midst of tremendous change from the
late 19 to the mid-20th century. The doctrine originally protected each
landowner’s right to the quiet enjoyment of his land.36 Courts thus
enjoined any use – even if otherwise legal – that infringed upon the
According to
essential elements of a landowner’s enjoyment.37
Blackstone’s Commentaries, “’it is incumbent on a neighboring owner to
find some other place,’” if the neighbor’s use of his land “’causes injury
to the land of another.’”38
As industrialization flourished, many courts became more
restrictive with the concept of nuisance.39 A primary means to allow
industrialization without formally altering the doctrine was to refuse to
th

34

GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 255 (1971).
There are multiple ways to categorize the cases, chronologically in recognition that
different historical periods may explain different outcomes, by state because different
cultural contexts may explain different outcomes, and by type of conduct in recognition
of jurisprudential differences. I chose the latter for ease of comparison among cases
and because this essay is attempting to understand modes of judicial decisionmaking.
36 MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 31
(Harvard U. Press 1977). As Louise Halper has written, nuisance has long been
considered a “messy and dated doctrine.” Louise Halper, Untangling the Nuisance
Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 90 (1998).
37 Rachel Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L. J. 1807, 1851-1858 (2004).
38 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 217-218; see also Louise A. Halper, Nuisance,
Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeal 1850-1915, 54 ALBANY L. REV.
301, 305 (1990); Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Pre sent, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 195 (1990).
39 Id. at 199.
35
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issue injunctive relief to enjoin prospective nuisances.40 Courts were in
considerable disagreement over the degree of interference that should be
legally tolerable and the relevance of social utility of defendants’ use.41
Some courts focused upon the plaintiff’s right to be free from
unreasonable interference. Others held that plaintiffs have an action only
if defendant’s use of his land is itself unlawful.42 Ultimately, some
courts began expressly to adopt a formulation of nuisance doctrine that
balanced the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, focusing on such
factors as the degree of harm, the locality, and the social value of
defendant’s actions.43
However, with regard to purely residential uses, not disputes
between residents and industry, courts have arguably become less
restrictive over the decades. Some courts never deviated from the more
formalistic definition of nuisance as any action that resulted in a
substantial harm to another’s use of land.44 Others, perhaps responding
to the recognition of the importance of aesthetics in land use planning
generally, have allowed aesthetic harms to form the basis for a nuisance
action.45At bottom, nuisance doctrine was largely in flux during the era in
which the race-nuisance cases were brought. Indeed, John Nagle, the
only recent scholar to grapple with the question of what sorts of harm are
or should be cognizable as nuisances,46 both acknowledges the difficulty
of identifying nuisance doctrine’s inherent limitations, and uses early
20th century nuisance cases to define the contours of actionable harm.
B.

The Mere Presence of a Black Family is Not a Nuisance

In 1883, the Kansas Supreme Court in a case entitled Falloon v.
Schilling considered the question of first impression of whether nuisance
doctrine entitled a white family to enjoin a neighboring landowner from
renting homes to Black families.47 In bold and sweeping language
authored by Justice David Brewer, the Court declared that it did not:

40

See Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627, 630 (1998). Some
courts limited anticipatory nuisance findings to “per se nuisances.” See, e.g., Cooper v.
Whissen, 130 S.W. 703, 704 (Ark. 1910); King v. Hamill, 54 A. 625, 627 (Md. 1903).
Others denied injunctive relief by requiring specific and definite allegations of harm;
see Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 128 (1873).
41 Lewin, supra note __, at 201-203.
42 Id. at 202.
43 Id. at 209.
44 See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969).
45 See, e.g. Prah v. Maretti, 108 2d 223 (1982).
46 Nagle, supra note __, passim.
47 29 Kan. 292.
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Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or
offensive. A negro family is not, per se, a nuisance; and a white
family cannot prevent his neighbor from renting his home to a
negro family any more than he can to a German, an Irish or a
French family.48
In Falloon, defendant Schilling owned an 80 acre tract in the rapidly
growing town of Hiawatha. He sold less than an acre of the land, which
was ultimately purchased by plaintiff Falloon, a white man who lived on
the property with his wife and young sons. The Falloon family home
was within 13 feet of the next lot. Schilling wanted to buy back the
land, but his offer was rejected. In his complaint, Falloon claims that
Schilling then “conceived the oppressive and unlawful idea of rendering
[his] home obnoxious and unendurable by erecting cheap tenement
houses on either side of [his] land and filling them with worthless
negroes, that they may annoy [Falloon’s] wife, who is a person of
delicate health”, and punish them for refusing Schilling’s offer.
Consistent with his plan, Schilling erected a small building of 12 by 20
feet, and placed it within four feet of Falloon’s land. He then rented it to
a “colored preacher, who occupied it with his wife and one child.”49
Falloon brought suit, seeking to enjoin Schilling from erecting
such buildings, on the grounds that the size of the homes and the race of
the occupants violated the maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedes.”50 The Court found that Falloon failed to sustain his allegations
since the homes, while small, looked neat and that the family in fact was
the family of a preacher and “behaved well” and were not “worthless
negroes.”51
In addition to the language noted above, with respect to the
renting to ‘negroes,’ the Court stated:
The law makes no distinction on account of race or color, and
recognizes no prejudices arising therefrom. As long as the
neighbor’s family is well behaved, it matters not what the color,
race, or habits may be, or how offensive personally or socially, it
may be to plaintiff; plaintiff has no cause of complaint in the
courts.52
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Id. at 294.
Id. at 292.
50 Id. at 293.
51 Id. at 292 (italics in the original). In addition, the court found that as a universal rule,
the size and quality of a house never itself constitutes a nuisance. “A land-owner may
erect upon his land the smallest or most temporary kind of dwelling
- house or store in
close proximity to the finest mansion.” Id. at 293.
52 Id. at 294.
49
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Nuisance treatises and digests immediately incorporated the Falloon
holding.53
Falloon and the treatise language it inspired appear to have
influenced at least two of the five other reported cases that considered
whether the mere presence or potential for the presence of Blacks or
other people of color near a white residence constituted a nuisance. In
Worm v. Wood,54 and Lancaster v. Harwood,55 both decided by appellate
courts in Texas in the early 1920s, the courts rejected plaintiffs’ requests
for injunctions to enjoin Blacks and Mexicans from moving nearby,
despite the claim that their presence “will greatly injure and practically
destroy the social conditions of the neighborhoods.”56
The Worm court quoted a treatise in dismissing the argument that
small shacks occupied by “negroes, and Mexicans and a low class of
white people”57 would allegedly cause unhealthy conditions and a
greater likelihood of fire. While the court allowed that such uses may in
the manner of their use constitute a nuisance, the court was firm that
“character of use is not inherent in the houses of the character of those
alleged in plaintiffs’ petition, and as the same will not necessarily follow,
the building of the houses, which is lawful, cannot be enjoined.”58 In
other words, small shacks housing Blacks, Mexicans, and poor whites
are not necessarily nuisances.
Worm was then cited by the court in Lancaster v. Harwood.59 In
contrast both to the egalitarian language employed by the court in
Falloon and the terse conclusions reached in Worm, the Lancastercourt
chose to cite the plaintiffs’ allegations at some length and to describe the
inner turmoil of the judges.
Agnes Harwood sought to enjoin John Lancaster from erecting a
garage and servants’ quarters, which would house “negro” servants. The
white family described the harm they would experience from the
presence of the ‘negro’ servants in detail.60 The Texas Supreme Court
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For example, an early authoritative treatise, the R.C.L. text stated:
It is true as a general proposition that a proprietor enjoys a right to improve his
own property in any way he sees fit, provided the improvement is not such a
one as the law will pronounce a nuisance; and this he may do, although he
make such improvement through malice or ill will. And accordingly it has
been held that the owner of land has the right to erect small, cheap and
movable tenement houses thereon close to the line of an adjacent owner, and
let them to orderly colored tenants.
20 R.C.L. s. 45, p. 429.
54 223 S.W. 1016 (1920).
55 245 S.W. 755 (1922).
56 Worm, 223 S.W. at 1018.
57 Id. at 1018.
58 Id. at 1019.
59 245 S.W. at 757.
60 Id. at 755-756.
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dissolved the trial court’s temporary restraining order, but made clear
that the judges personally sympathized with the appellee:
We earnestly deprecate the inexorable mandate of the law
forbidding us the privilege of following our own personal
sentiments, which, as individuals, we are frank to admit, are
wholly with the appellee, and which if we were at liberty to
follow, would result in granting the appellee the relief sought.61
The Court noted the inefficiency of law:
To prevent all acts of injustice from being inflicted, and that,
where the law is powerless in its application to prevent such
injuries, the observance of the "Golden Rule" can only be looked
to as a panacea in that portion of our country where there exists a
just and a well-defined impassable gulf between the white
element of its population and the negro race. But, as the hand of
our invisible Guide leads us, we must follow on to a conclusion,
ascertaining and declaring the rights of litigants as justified and
determined by the established rules of law.62
In 1929, in Woods v. Kiersky,63 a third Texas court dismissed
without discussion an attempt by John W. Woods to enjoin his neighbor
from building a garage that would house Blacks. The court dismissed as
“mere surplasage” Woods’ claim that his family would be disturbed by
the use of the upper story of the garage by Black people.64
Neither Falloon nor the treatises were cited in the remaining
three reported cases on this issue, Holbrook v. Morrison,65 in
Massachusets in 1913, Diggs v. Morgan College,66 in Maryland in 1918,
and Crist v. Henshaw,67 in Oklahoma in 1945. Nonetheless, in each, the
appellate courts denied the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctions, holding
that the presence of a disliked racial group fails to constitute a nuisance.
Holbrook, reminiscent of Falloon, involved a suit by a white
landowner seeking to enjoin another white landowner from placing a
sign in front of her house stating “For Sale Best Offer from Colored
Family.”68 The Massachusets Supreme Court equated the right to sell to
a “colored family” with other land actions that are legal even if harmful
to a neighbor’s property:
There can be no doubt that the respondent has the right to
advertise her property for sale by signs or in the usual way, and to
sell it if she sees fit to a negro family, even though the effect may
61

Id. at 756-757.
Id. at 757.
63 14 S.W.2d 825.
64 Id. at 828.
65 100 N.E. 1111 (1913).
66 105 A. 157 (1918).
67 163 P.2d 214 (1945),
68 100 N.E at 1111.
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be to impair the business of the complainants; just as for instance,
the owner of land on a hillside may cultivate it in the usual way
even though the effect of the surface drainage may be to fill up
his neighbors millpond below.69
The Maryland Supreme Court rejected a white homeonwer’s suit in
Diggs, 70 on constitutional grounds. In that case, white homeowners
sought to prevent a Black college from expanding its housing, and the
court did not focus on nuisance law doctrine, but simply cited the
Supreme Court’s decision striking down racial zoning, Buchanan v.
Warley.71
After Diggs, there were no reported cases involving challenges to
the mere presence of Blacks for a few decades. In Crist v. Henshaw,
decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1945, white homeowners
argued that subdividing a tract of land to create a settlement of persons
“exclusively of African descent” was a public nuisance because it would
reduce and destroy the market value of their property and create
“insufferable and unlivable conditions.”72 The plaintiffs also argued that
the sale of property to negroes would destroy the school system and
require plaintiffs to abandon their homes.73 As in Diggs, the Court
decided on constitutional grounds, finding that such a holding would
impair the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th amendment. The
Court’s reasoning, that “it would be discrimination for a court to restrict
such sales” was the precise reasoning used by the Supreme Court three
years later in Shelley v. Kraemer.74
* * *
It appears that no appellate courts between the end of
Reconstruction and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education found
the mere presence of Blacks or Mexicans to be a nuisance. These
outcomes are surprisingly contrary to the assumptions most academics
would bring to their consideration of property doctrine arising from this
era and should be food for thought for property and race scholars alike.
However, it is worth noting that two trial courts reached contrary
69

Id.
105 A. at 159.
71 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Court stated: “Whatever may have been entertained
formerly, since the decision in Buchanan v. Warely, and Jackson v. State, it is clear that
the improvement of land as a colored residential neighborhood is not of itself a public
nuisance.” 105 A. at 159.
72 163 P.2d 214.
73 Id. at 215.
74 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court went on to say without any direct citations that: “The
law is clear that the sale of land to negroes or the improvement of lands as a residential
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conclusions. In Holbrook and Lancaster, the appellate courts reversed
trial court decisions granting injunctions to the white homeowners.
Because trial court decisions are typically unpublished, it is impossible
to know with any certainty what number of other cases were brought and
decided in favor of white homeowners and never appealed.
C.

Mixed Results in Conduct Cases

In the “mere presence” cases described in the previous section,
the reported court decisions and treatises on the issue were uniform.
This section describes cases involving claims that certain conduct
engaged in by people of color constituted a nuisance. White plaintiffs
sought to paint Black churches, funeral homes, parks, homes for orphans
and the aged, hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoriums, dance halls,
crowded housing, and saloons as nuisances. In a slight majority, 13 of
23 cases, appellate courts rejected claims that these land uses by Blacks
constituted a nuisance. As with the presence cases, however, even those
opinions favoring Black landowners often evinced racial bias and
stereotypes.
1.
Churches
Outside of the race-nuisance context, it was well-established that
churches were not nuisances per se, but could in rare circumstances be
considered nuisances in fact if their operation had an ill effect on
neighboring residents’ enjoyment of their land.
In three instances, white communities sought to enjoin the
construction or operation of Black churches. The Supreme Courts of
both Kentucky (in 1903)75 and Oklahoma (in 1924) 76 declined to grant
the white communities the relief they sought, but in South Carolina (in
1940), 77 the Court found the way in which the prayer services were
conducted to be a nuisance in fact. In all three cases, white communities
inveighed against the perceived exuberant style of Black worship, which
they claimed affected their use and enjoyment of their property and
decreased its property value.78
However, both Boyd v. Bd. of
75

Boyd, 77 S.W.669.
Spencer Chapel, 231 P. 1074.
77 Morrison, 7 S.E.2d 635.
78 In a related context, the St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a
Black minister for breaching the peace with his shouts of “Amen,” “Praise God,” and
“Glory Hallelujah” in a voice loud enough to be heard six blocks away. City of
Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S.W. 316 (1927) (“not to be officially published”). The
court stated that it could not bring itself to construe the breach of the peace statute to
embrace religious fervor, noting that “there was once a time in this country when a
minister, whose voice would not have carried for a greater distance than two city
blocks, would certainly have been accepted with greatly restrained enthusiasm.” Id. at
318. The court also stated that it could not imagine that the city fathers could have
intended for the ordinance to prohibit the sounds of worship in either “a lowly negro
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Councilman of the City of Frankfort79 and Spencer Chapel Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Brogan80 involved attempts to prohibit the
construction of a new church facility, while Morrison v. Rawlinson81
involved a City Council attempt to declare the existing church a nuisance
in fact.
In Spencer Chapel,82 white plaintiffs testified that they had been
disturbed by noise and shouting at the church, and by those congregating
around the church. Plaintiffs sought to show that “the construction of the
church would decrease the salable value of the property in that
comm
unity by making it impossible to sell to white people as residence
property” – though plaintiffs also stated in their brief that:
Property owners . . . are in no wise [sic] prejudiced against the
negro race, that objections to the building of this church are not
made solely for the reason that it is a negro church, but discloses
proof that defendants in error are opposed to the construction of
any church on said lot.83
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim, stating that no
case had previously held that a church is a nuisance.84 The Court did not
credit the evidence of commotion or disorder. Ultimately, the Court
seemed to decide against plaintiffs because they were using the lawsuit
as a device to transform a Black community into a white community.
The Court stated that:
The plaintiffs have bought property and established their
residences in what was a negro community at the time the brick
church was built. If this congregation should be prohibited from
constructing the church building no doubt the negro population
would gradually grow less. The negro is of a social and religious
nature. Their social gatherings are usually at the church . . If they
are required to build their church in some other community, no

congregation, housed in a temporary frame shack on the outskirts of town, or of a
fashionable white congregation, assembled together in a beautiful and costly edifice,
erected in an exclusive residential district.” Id.
79 77 S.W. 669.
80 231 P. 1074.
81 7 S.E.2d 635.
82 231 P. at 1075. White plaintiffs contended that Black churches in a white
community “would constitute a nuisance, and thereby decrease the salable value of
their property.” The church had bought the property and built a brick church in 1903 or
1904, before any whites were living in the vicinity. The structure burned down and the
church entered into a contract to build a modern new church building. The evidence
showed that some of the blocks near the church were predominantly Black while others
had recently become majority white.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1075-76.
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doubt their population will trend in that direction. This appears
to be the theory of the plaintiffs.85
Petitioners in Boyd v. Board of City Councilmen of the City of
Frankfurt,86 were members of the First (Colored) Baptist Church who
had been denied a permit to construct a new church building on their
land and then arrested for beginning construction. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals considered the enforceability of a statute which the Court
found was “manifestly passed to prevent the erecting of the [First
(Col ored) Baptist Church] church building “ on the ground that the
erection of the church and the worship within it would constitute a public
nuisance. The court rejected the City Council’s attempt to designate the
proposed church a nuisance, holding that: “the term ‘nuisance’ has a
well-defined legal meaning. A thing cannot be declared a nuisance
which is in fact not a nuisance.”87 The court explained that previous case
law had declared that injunctions are not to be granted for threatened
nuisances unless such proposed use is a nuisance per se. Despite some
residents’ complaints against the loud singing by church members in the
old building, the court was unwilling to find that the proposed new
building could be considered a per se nuisance. Accordingly, the court
held, the common council was without power to deny the permit as a
nuisance.88
By contrast, in Morrison v. Rawlinson,89 the South Carolina
Supreme Court did find the Black church to be a nuisance. In that case,
plaintiffs, members of the House of Prayer, a Black church, sought to
enjoin the Chief of Police and the City Council of Columbia, South
Carolina from shutting them down as a public nuisance. Notably, white
residents had protested the City Council’s decision to grant the church a
builing permit to construct its church in 1933 to no avail. However, in
1938, the City Council relented and declared the church a nuisance. The
Court found that services were carried on daily from early in the morning
til the evening, and resulted in “tumult [that] can be heard for many city
blocks.”90 The Court stated that “white residents who live in the vicinity
testified that life is made unbearable by the continual din, which deprives
them of all peace and tranquility, and makes sleep impossible.”91
The Court held that the church services did not constitute a
nuisance per se and disagreed with the City Council that it had the power
to declare the House of Prayer a public nuisance without a general
ordinance. However, after its own determination that the manner of
85
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89 7 S.E.2d 635.
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church services constituted a public nuisance the Court ultimately upheld
the injunction. While the Court emphasized its “deep and sympathetic
understanding of this type of worship carried on by members of this
negro church,”92 it stated that “their form of worship is inseparably
connected with and accompanied by unrestrained noise and consequent
public disturbance.”93
2.
Funeral Homes and Cemeteries
Challenges to funeral homes and cemeteries regardless of the
race of the deceased were fairly regular in the late 19th and early 20th
century.94 Treatises generally state that cemeteries and funeral homes
are not nuisances per se, but that they can become nuisances in
operation. The treatises identify a small number of race-neutral cases in
which cemeteries were found to be nuisances. Funeral homes in
residential neighborhoods were regularly found to be nuisances as a
result of odors from embalming fluid and the like and the fear that
cadavers might introduce contagious disease.
The race-nuisance challenges to these land uses fall into two
quite different categories: white challenges to proposed funereal or
burial uses by Blacks,95 and challenges on behalf of Blacks to funereal or
burial uses. As with the church cases, these challenges met with mixed
success. In the first category of cases, the Supreme Court of Georgia
twice rejected claims that a Black cemetery proposed for a white
residential neighborhood would constitute a nuisance per se, while the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1932 found that a Black funeral home in
a white residential neighborhood was properly determined a nuisance per
se. In the second, a Florida Court upheld the finding that a cemetery in a
Black community constituted a nuisance (against a vigorous dissent that
the majority was improperly crediting the alleged special sensitivities of
Blacks to death), while a Pennsylvania Court rejected the claim that a
cemetery in a residential area was a nuisance despite the fact that
“colored help” would be disinclined to work in the area if a cemetery
were allowed to be built.
The Georgia cases are consistent with the treatment of challenges
to white cemeteries. In 1933, in Hall v. Moffett,96 the Supreme Court of
Georgia rejected white plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin the use of city land
for a Black cemetery. Plaintiffs claimed that such use would “be
detrimental and injurious to the health, happiness, peace and contentment
92
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Id. at 640.
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VARIOUS FORMS 822 (Albany: 1875).
95 Id. Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548; Hall, 170 S.E. 193; Killian, 154 S.W.2d 387; Young, 64
A.2d 814; Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785.
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of . . . petitioners as well as a great many others, . . . that it will greatly
depreciate the value of the property adjacent to said private cemetery,”
and finally, that “the injury and damage to petitioners’ property and their
sense of pride in their community will be irreparable.”97 The Court
reaffirmed the rule that cemeteries are not nuisances per se, and that in
previous decisions it had held that cemeteries will not be enjoined unless
likely to contaminate water or air.98 The Supreme Court of Missouri
also followed this precedent in 1941, rejecting a challenge by Finton O.
Killian and Gover Sibley to the operation of a cemetery for orthodox
Jews.99 Even before the orthodox congregation purchased the land, it
had been designated as a cemetery. Therefore, it appears clear that
plaintiffs objected specifically to the fact that Jews would be buried on
the property.100
In Qualls v. City of Memphis,101 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
deviated from general precedent by holding that a proposed Black
funeral home in a white residential area was a nuisance per se. S.W.
Qualls, a successful Black funeral home director, brought suit against the
City of Memphis to challenge the denial of a permit for him to open a
funeral home in a white residential area. The area was zoned for
commercial use, but the City denied Quall’s permit on grounds that a
funeral home in the area would constitute a nuisance per se, “whether for
the white or colored race,” because of possible emissions of odors and
noises.102 However, the Board resolution then stated:
While the Board is of the opinion and finds, that it cannot and
will not discriminate against said S.W. Qualls, because he is a
member of the colored race, or because he intends to conduct a
funeral home on the premises for colored persons, yet the Board
finds, from the proof, that members of the colored race are very
emotional, and that funerals of members of that race are attended
by loud speaking, singing, moaning, and other sounds which
would be obnoxious and offensive to persons in the immediate
neighborhood.103
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Qualls’ argument that the
Board discriminated on the grounds of race. Instead, the Court credited
the Board’s conclusion that the plot was too small for use as a funeral
97
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home and indeed, blamed Qualls for purchasing the property in a white
neighborhood in the first place: “Mr. Qualls purchased this property
with full knowledge that it was in a residential district, and occupied as
homes by white people, and he must have known that a funeral home
conducted in this building within a very few feet, eight or ten feet, of
homes occupied by families, would be very objectionable and very
distasteful.”104
However, in a related case, published a year later, the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee held for Mr. Qualls when he sought a permit to
use the downstairs of the same property as a showroom for caskets and
the upstairs as a family residence.105 While the language of the first case
involving Mr. Qualls suggests that the decision was based in significant
part on the race of the plaintiffs and defendants, the Court in the second
Qualls case did not use race as an excuse to rule for the white neighbors
who were resistant to Mr. Qualls’ presence. The second Qualls case is in
some sense more akin to the “mere presence” cases described in the
earlier section.
In the second category of “death cases” in which the allegedly
special sensitivities of Blacks to the presence of cemeteries were at issue,
the courts reached conflicting results.106 Both cases involved residential
communities attempting to enjoin the establishment of a cemetery on
grounds that it would change the character of the neighborhood with
increased visitors and traffic, noise, potential groundwater
contamination. The plaintiffs in these cases also alleged that thoughts of
death would be generally annoying, but would cause particular harm to
Blacks. Young v. St. Martins,107 however, was brought by wealthy white
residents, who claimed the cemetery would create a difficulty keeping
“colored help” while Jones v. Trawick appears to have been brought by
Black plaintiffs.108
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The majority decision in the Florida case does not mention the
race of the plaintiffs or the race of those to be buried in the cemetery.
However, the dissent contends that the race of the plaintiffs was central
to the holding. The dissenting Justices note that the area was covenanted
to restrict occupancy to Blacks, and stated that:
[I]t is insisted, in effect, that because of the peculiar aversion of
Negroes to graveyards and the extreme lament of colored
mourners, the normal lives of the appellants would be so affected
as to render the use as a cemetery of the property so near them a
nuisance.109
The dissent argued against deciding a case based upon particular
aversions of one race: “I cannot agree that what might be a nuisance for
one race would not be a nuisance for another.”110
3.
Hospitals, Sanatoriums, and Orphanages
Homeowners often objected to the presence hospitals,
sanatoriums and orphanages in their midst even when race was not at
issue. As with cemeteries and funeral homes, treatises from the decades
in which the race-nuisance cases were brought state that such institutions
are not nuisances per se, but can become nuisances in operation. Of the
four race-nuisance cases challenging these sorts of land uses, only Giles
v. Rawlings, decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1918, found
that such a claim was cognizable.111
In Giles v. Rawlings, a white plaintiff, J.P. Giles, sought to enjoin
the operation of a hospital for Blacks. The neighborhood in which the
hospital was operating was largely residential, except for a hospital
operated by Rawlings for white people. Rawlings decided to transform a
small house at the rear of the hospital into a hospital for Blacks, which
was across the street from Giles’ home. Giles claimed he and his family
were unable to enjoy their home as a result of the obnoxious odors, the
noise from patients “whether from the effects of being treated, or from
their nature,” the sight of the negro patients, and finally, the noise from
the carrying of the dead from the hospital.112 The lower court had denied
the injunction, refusing to hold that the hospital was a nuisance per se
and, finding that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. The Georgia
Supreme Court reversed; it did not hold that the hospital was a nuisance
per se, but that plaintiff had a right to invoke the aid of equity. The
ultimate resolution is unreported.

unhappy thoughts.” The Court then extended the rule generally applicable to funeral
homes to cemeteries. 75 So.2d 785.
109 Id. at 789 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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111 97 S.E. 521 (1918).
112 Id. at 521-22.
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In 1924, in City Council of City and County of Denver v. the
United Negro Protection Ass’n,113 the Colorado Supreme Court
unanimously granted the United Negroes Protective Association’s
request for a writ of mandamus against the Denver City Council,
compelling the City to grant it a permit to operate a home for Black aged
and an orphanage for Black children. According to the Court, a large
number of residents of the neighborhood protested the petition for a
permit to open the home on the ground that “such an institution would be
detrimental to the public health and safety of the people living in the
vicinity.”114 The committee on health agreed without investigation and
at the same meeting, the council denied the permit.
The Court found the decision to be arbitrary and without
justification, particularly since the area was heavily industrial and, most
relevant perhaps, “another institution for white children . . . of the same
general character” was operating on the same block.115 The Court
rejected the City’s claim that the decision was fully within its discretion,
finding that municipal decisions were not beyond the control of the
courts when they are arbitrary or the result of gross abuse of discretion.
Unlike the Giles Court, which made no mention of the unchallenged
white hospital, the Colorado Court thus appeared to equate the presence
of Black and white children.
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Redmond v. State,116 decided
in 1928, denied the State Attorney General’s suit for an injunction to
prohibit a Black man, H.R. Redmond, from administering drugs and
medicine. The Attorney General alleged that Redmond was “an ignorant
and illiterate person of the colored race” who was treating patients in
unsanitary conditions, causing a public nuisance.” According to state
testimony, “the conditions at Redmond’s office were unclean: flies,
spiders, and roaches also being in some of the concoctions”, and they
found the presence of white girls, one with “underclothing . . . above her
knees.”117
The Court concluded that Redmond was practicing medicine
without a license, but held that an injunction was not a proper remedy.
The Court reasoned that at common law, a license was not necessary to
prescribe medicine; Redmond’s operation was therefore not a nuisance
per se. Mississippi had enacted a statute that provided for a jury
determination of whether a certain practice injured the health and was a
nuisance. Accordingly, the Court held that Redmond had a right to a
jury trial: “It is a delicate, though often a necessary, thing to condemn a
business operated by a citizen. It may result in great loss, or even ruin,
113
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to his business. The Legislature, realizing the delicacy of the power
conferred, . . . .has provided a jury, and the cause should have been
proceeded with under that statute.”118
In Mitchell v. Deisch,119 decided in 1929, Ms. Frances Mitchell
and other white landowners sought to enjoin the construction of the
Arkansas Negro Tuberculosis Sanatorium near their homes as contrary to
the state’s policy of segregating the races and as a nuisance. The Court
rejected the first claim on the ground that the decision of where to locate
the sanatorium was within the Board’s province. It rejected the second
as well, supported by evidence that sanatoriums do not affect land values
and case law and treatises for the proposition that sanatoriums and
hospitals do not constitute nuisances per se. It is not clear from the
appellate opinion whether plaintiffs argued that a sanatorium for Blacks
in an otherwise white community should be considered a nuisance even
if one for whites would not have been. Justice Mehaffy dissented,
claiming that the location of the sanatorium in a white community
violated the statute directing the Board to locate the facility near the
Negro community, claiming “the Legislature would refuse to locate a
tuberculosis sanatorium for white people among negroes. One would be
as bad as the other, and each, in my judgment, would be in violation of
the policy of the state.”120
4.
Places of Amusement
Courts generally held that places of amusement such as
playgrounds, athletic fields, gardens, dance halls, and theatres were not
nuisances per se, but could become so in operation. Saloons, except
during prohibition, were similarly treated. In the race nuisance cases,
courts generally refused to enjoin the operation of places of amusements
for Blacks, despite white protest.
In 1931, in Jones v. Little Rock Boys Club, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas refused to enjoin the construction of a club for underprivileged
boys.121 Similarly, in 1943, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
Dudley v. City of Charlotte,122 refused to enjoin the City of Charlotte
from establishing a public park for Blacks. Both Courts relied upon
precedent that places of amusement are not nuisances per se.
Two cases, Theonebe v. Mosby,123 decided by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in 1917, and Green v. State ex rel. Chatham,124 decided
decades later by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1952, involved
118
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challenges to extant dance halls. Both Courts reaffirmed the principle
that dance halls are not per se nuisances, but they diverged in their
findings as to whether the dance halls at issue were nuisances in fact. In
Theonebe, the Court refused to grant the white residents’ request for an
injunction to limit the hours of a dance hall patronized by “colored
people.”125 The Court found that the patrons were “respectable, wellbehaved people,” and since the neighborhood was not strictly residential,
residents must endure some noise from commercial and business
establishments.126 The race of the patrons is noted as a fact, but not
discussed in the conclusions of law. By contrast, the Court in Green
determined a nuisance a “juke box” that attracted large numbers of “the
colored race” who danced, shouted and sang into the early morning
hours of Sunday, depriving other residents of their sleep.127 The Court
appeared to be particularly troubled by the “swearing and unprintable
profanity” to which the neighborhood women and children were
subjected.128 The situation was exacerbated by “calls of nature” for
which there were no facilities, resulting in indecent exposure and
horrible odors.129 The Court found that the dance hall constituted a
public nuisance, but limited its injunction, holding that the owner was
restricted from playing the juke box during worship hours or too late at
night. The Court resorted to a contextual definition of public nuisance -“whatever shocks the public morals and sense of decency; whatever
shocks the religious feelings of the community or tends to its
discomfort”130
Generally, courts distinguished between disorderly and orderly
saloons, determining that the disorderly ones constituted a nuisance.131
In Fox v. Corbitt,132 for example, white homeowners challenged a grocer
operating a saloon. In that case, the Court granted the white residents’
request for an injunction, stating that the place was “in every sense of the
word a “negro dive” in which “large crowds of negroes of low order”
assembled.133 The Court relied, along with racist stereotypes, on proof
that people got drunk and had fights on the sidewalk and the
“unmentionable indecencies and exposures of their persons.”134
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5.
Crowded Housing
I have identified two cases in which white plaintiffs succeeded in
designating as nuisances densely populated areas inhabited by Blacks or
Mexicans. In Harty v. Guerra,135 decided by an appellate court in Texas
in 1925, the court found that defendants created a nuisance in a “white
residential neighborhood” by dividing a home and stable into rooms
housing up to 50 Mexican “peons,” who kept cows and fowl, maintained
a “din of noises from musical instruments, singing, wood
chopping,…[and] the barking of dogs.136 The court likened the
conditions to the operation of a cotton gin, polluting factory, and the
housing of cattle, and issued an injunction against the nuisance-like
conditions.
However, the opinion does not clarify exactly which
conduct was enjoined or whether the residents were expected to move.137
Indeed, the court specificially held that “[t]his order is, of course, not to
be interpreted as prohibiting the indulgence in music or the cutting of
wood upon the premises at reasonable hours and in such a manner as not
reasonably to interfere with the rights of appellants.”138
Similarly, in the last race-nuisance case, Wright v. DeFatta,
decided in 1962, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from “placing
an excessive number of Negro dwellings contrary to the Municipal
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.”139 The court held that such a gross
violation of the zoning ordinance constituted a nuisance per se.
III.

THEORIES AND COUNTER-THEORIES
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Legal opinions are rich materials for insight into how the ruling
elites within the particular states sought to express and understand their
own moral and legal ideals.140 As Robert Gordon has argued:
Because [legal opinions] are the most rationalized and elaborated
legal products, you'll find in them an exceptionally refined and
concentrated version of legal consciousness. Moreover, if you
can crack the codes of these mandarin texts, you'll often have
tapped into a structure that isn't at all peculiar to lawyers but that
is the prototype speech behind many different dialect discourses
in the society.141
This Part will use the race nuisance cases to test the explanatory
power of several prevailing scholarly theories of the role of courts during
the Jim Crow era. The cases obviously refute the prevailing view that
the courts were mere engines of white supremecy, openly eschewing the
rule of law. Instead, the cases show that no single theory is fully
explanatory. The cases reflect a strain of reflexive formalism and a
surprising concern for the ideal of race neutrality. When the race
nuisance cases are seen in concern with other attempts to whites to
pursue residential segregation, however, many support Derrick Bell’s
interest convergence argument.142
A.

State Courts Furthering White Supremecy

The Jim Crow era has been described as a “time when race
relations in law, politics, and general social contemplation hit rockbottom levels of injustice and callousness.”143 Randall Kennedy refers to
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it as the “Age of Segregation,”144 and Cheryl Harris calls it “a time of
acute crisis for Blacks.”145 Between 1890 and 1907, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Georgia
all amended their constitutions to disenfranchise virtually all Black
people.146 Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas statutorily employed
devices such as poll taxes to accomplish the same ends.147 While the
Supreme Court decided some cases that prevented Black
disenfranchisement, Blacks were not truly enfranchised again in the
South until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1966.148 In
addition to constitutionally and statutorily disenfranchising Blacks, the
Southern and Border states were also enacting segregation laws
beginning with education and moving toward transportation, public
accommodations, cemeteries, hospitals, prisons, and, infamously,
drinking fountains.149
Perhaps not surprisingly then, many scholars hold the view that
state courts in the Jim Crow era abandoned the rule of law when issues
of race emerged and became tools of racial subordination. In a recent
revisionist account of civil rights lawyering that otherwise provides a
facsciating and rich account of the development of civil rights legal
strategies, Professor Kenneth Mack asserts generally that the common
law was “not neutral with regard to race, but was subject to
discriminatory decisionmaking.”150 In his discussion of the similarities
and differences between racism in state courts during Apartheid era
South Africa and Jim Crow America, the late A. Leon Higginbothom
concluded with a general theory that these courts exemplified much of
the racism present in the larger society.151 He argued that the cases he
analyzed “reflect the ways in which the courts have directly or indirectly
contributed to the maintenance of black subjugation within an

and rejected more progressive models of constitutional interpretation, thus, that
Schmitt’s praise was unwarranted.
144 Kennedy, supra note __, at 1650.
145 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746 (1993).
146 Id. at 178.
147 Id.
148 KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note __, at 86.
149 See AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO 184
(New York: 1970); Schmitt, supra note __, at 454-473.
150 Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE L. J. 256, n54 (2004).
151 The late Judge Higginbotham examined segregation and overt discrimination in
Jim Crow courts, as well as “more insidious forms of court-enforced racism, including:
refusal to accord black witnesses the civilities customarily accorded to white witnesses;
attacks on the credibility of blacks as witnesses or accused; prosecutorial appeals to fear
of violence by blacks; reliance on claims that racial minorities have a propensity toward
violence; use of racist comments; and overtly racist conduct by judges.” A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similarities and
Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990).
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interlocking system of discriminatory practices and beliefs.”152
Higginbotham further concluded that during the Jim Crow era, “the
courts, and along with them, the rule of law, became not impartial
arbiters of societal relations but instead the mirror and enforcer of
property interests.”153
In her study, The Pig Farmer’s Daughter and Other Tales of
American Justice, Mary Frances Berry is equally critical of state courts
during the Jim Crow era. 154 In her analysis of involving the interplay of
race and sex in the courts from the post-Civil War era to the present,
Berry concluded: “Judges continued to affirm the old story of propertied
white male privilege and racial subordination.” 155 Interestingly, Berry
rests this conclusion on courts’ willingess to uphold wills that granted
property to Black women and mixed-race children.156
Benno Schmitt agreed: “law was the foundation of the structure
of racial separation” beginning with the informal practices of sheriffs and
judges.157 He also claimed that: “Jim Crow laws reflected a society that
felt itself under no constraint to treat blacks equally, not even in the
formal constraint of legal fiction.”158
Michael Klarman has been less categorical. His recent book
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights carefully distinguished between different
decades in the late 19th and early 20th century. While he has agreed with
Schmitt that the Progressive era was a period “before the culturally elite
values of judges translated into egalitarian racial ideals,”159 he
acknowledged that southern judges after World War I began to overturn
some egregious convictions of black defendants. Klarman claimed on
the one hand that state courts’ “proud pretentions to color-blind justice
were absurd”160 in light of the barriers to Blacks’ equal participation in
the legal system. However, he also granted that judges may have
believed their own rhetoric. He ultimately concludes that any “liberal
sentiment tended to evaporate in cases that were perceieved to involve
broader challenges to white supremacy or that generated criticisms of
161
white southerners.”
In such a state
court system, however, we would expect nuisance
suits seeking to protect white landowners from the presence of Black
152
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families to have been successful. Nuisance doctrine itself did not clearly
preclude such a result.
As John Nagle acknowledges, “virtually
anything could interfere with someone’s use and enjoyment of land.”162
Indeed, an early English treatise included as a common nuisance
“subdividing houses in good neighborhoods ‘that become hurtful to the
place by overpestring it with the poor.’”163 If common law English
courts found that the presence of poor people constituted a nuisance, why
did post-Reconstruction American courts not similarly judge the
presence racial minorities? The realist critique would certainly have
suggested such a result. But, as we have seen, they did not. Instead, the
cases stand squarely against the claims of many scholars that state courts
expressly eschewed any need to apply the rule of law equally to Blacks.
If the commonly held view is inaccurate, what was motivating
these judges? The next section will consider the most obvious countertheory: that these judges were strict rule-of-law formalists.
B.

Reflexive Formalism in Operation?

It seems unlikely that the all of the many judges who decided the
race-nuisance cases were closet anti-racists. Therefore, the most logical
counter-explanation to the commonly held view is that the judges were
simply acting in conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence of the
day. The late 19th century and very early 20th century is often described
as an era of reflexive formalism, so perhaps nuisance doctrine itself
accounts for the cases.164 Indeed, this theory offers an explanation for
Berry’s inheritance cases; she notes: “The courts decided to base their
decisions on the formal legal rule that the law would implement the
proven will of the testator.”165 To test this theory in the nuisance
context, this section explores the contours of nuisance doctrine as
applied by the judges in the race-nuisance cases and more significantly,
assesses whether that doctrine actually operated as a constraint upon the
judges’ own preferred outcome.
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This counter-theory is helpful. The cases suggest that formalist
judging often prevailed then – as it often does now.166 However, when
considered with the related cases involving restrictive covenants and
racial zoning, race and land use cases cannot ultimately support a
particularly robust version of formalism. Two doctrinal principles
emerge as most determinate in the race nuisance cases. First, a proposed
land use was generally not a nuisance, and second, a use that caused only
psychic or social harms was generally not a nuisance. There were
exceptions to these principles, however. If a use was labeled a “per se”
nuisance, it could be enjoined prior to operation, and second,
psychological or social harms involving the specter of death, such as
cemeteries and funeral homes, or the harms caused by immoral behavior,
such as prostitution, were sometimes considered a nuisance. As a result,
like the theory of courts-as-pawns, reflexive formalism fails to explain
the range of decisions in these cases.
The most significant doctrinal constraint appears to have been
courts’ reluctance to grant an injunction in anticipatory nuisance cases.
Of the 28 cases, 19 involved attempts to enjoin anticipatory nuisances
and only three of these were successful.167 By contrast, in the nine cases
in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin present nuisances, courts found
nuisances in five of the cases.168
Courts denying injunctions for proposed land uses often referred
to some version of the maxim that:
Where an injunction is sought merely on the ground that a lawful
erection will be put to a use that will constitute a nuisance, the
court will ordinarily refuse to restrain the construction or
completion of the erection leaving the complainant free, however,
to assert his rights thereafter in an appropriate manner if the
contemplated use results in a nuisance.169
166
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This principle has long been recognized by nuisance scholars and clearly
provides a powerful explanation for the outcome of a significant number
of the race-nuisance cases.
However, courts did not always apply this doctrine.170 In Qualls,
for example, the Board of Adjustment of the City of Memphis found that
the operation of a funeral home on the particular lot in question would be
a nuisance as a matter of law because of the emission of odors and
noises. Mr. Qualls challenged this finding, arguing that the Board could
not find as a fact that his business would a nuisance prior to its operation.
The Court agreed with the Board that the funeral home could be
considered a nuisance per se, holding that to place such an institution
near a residence would result in a condition of “discomfort and
inconvenience.”171 Though the following year, Mr. Qualls was allowed
to operate a casket show room and to move into the living quarters
above.172
The second doctrinal constraint appears to be the ad coelum rule,
under which property owners are “entitled to be free from all physical
invasions across the borders of their land,”173 but not necessarily to be
free from more inchoate assaults to a property owner’s social or
psychological state. Yet courts ignored this rule as well.
Nuisance law historically recognized harm across a broad
spectrum.174 On one end was the standard nuisance case involving air
pollution (smoke or soot) that caused an actual physical harm.175 In the
middle of the spectrum were cases involving loud noises or noxious
odors which did not result in injury but which were readily identified as
sensory harms.176 At the furthest end of the spectrum we see a doctrinal
shift – some courts were sympathetic to claims of emotional harm
emanating from the presence of dead people or people engaged in what
was considered illicit or immoral conduct.177
In the death cases, for example, some courts agreed that the
proximity of a funeral home or (in fewer cases) a cemetery caused “great

for the purpose for which it is erected. It might become such in the manner of its use,
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discomfort, depression and unhappy thoughts,”178“depression,
nervousness, lying awake at night, children made excited”179 and the
“dampening effect” on the use of outdoor spaces.180 In the bawdy house
cases, courts considered the sights and sounds of the prostitutes and
customers offensive to neighboring residents; the presence of the activity
caused the property values in the neighborhood to decline and rendered
the properties unfit for families.181
The harms alleged in the death and bawdy house cases were not
unlike those alleged in the race-nuisance cases. In Falloon, the plaintiff
claimed that the presence of a Black family close to his property would
“annoy plaintiff’s wife, who is a person of delicate health.”182 In Worm
v. Wood, plaintiffs claimed that the shacks would be occupied by
“negroes, Mexicans, and a low class of white people, which will greatly
injure and practically destroy social conditions in the neighborhood” and
would thus “greatly depreciate plaintiff’s property.”183 Most vividly, in
Lancaster v. Harwood, plaintiffs alleged that the presence of a Black
family a few feet away results in an odor that is “offensive,
objectionable, and undesirable, and in a southern climate is so bad as to
destroy the comfortable enjoyment of life in close proximity thereto, and
is offensive at a distance of 10 to 15 feet to white persons of ordinary
sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes and habits.”184
In light of the racial mores of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, it would not have been surprising if courts had applied the
reasoning in the death and bawdy house cases to the race-nuisance cases
and found that the presence of a Black family in a white neighborhood
constituted a nuisance per se. In other words, nuisance doctrine alone
cannot explain the outcome in the race nuisance cases. It still remains to
be determined why courts did not place the presence of Black families in
white neighborhoods in the same category as funeral homes or bawdy
houses – uses that do not cause a physical harm, but allegedly result in
declining property values and an inability to enjoy their homes.
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C.

A Race Neutrality Ideal at Work?

This section considers whether the principle or ideal of equal
treatment under law was itself the explanation for why race mixing was
not added to the list of “per se” nuisances. This principle was,
obviously, not found in common law. However, in response to the
“Black Codes” that proliferated in the post-Civil War South, the
Reconstruction Congress enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
provided to all persons regardless of race “the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens.”185 Therefore, Congress enshrined in law the
rights of Blacks to private property.
The first case in which a plaintiff sought a legal injunction
against the presence of a Black family, Falloon v. Schilling, was decided
in 1883 in Kansas, toward the end of Reconstruction and in a border
state.186 Nuisance doctrine was not entirely dispositive – though it
militated against a finding for the plaintiffs. In addition to nuisance
doctrine, the Court had as a background principle the Civil Rights Act of
1866 – and the language of the opinion tracks the Civil Rights Act and
the ideals underlying its passage. As noted above, in Falloon, the Court
stated: Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or
offensive.187
The opinion went on:
The law makes no distinction on account of race or color, and
recognizes no prejudices arising therefrom. As long as the
neighbor’s family is well behaved, it matters not what the color,
race, or habits may be, or how offensive personally or socially, it
may be to plaintiff; plaintiff has no cause of complaint in the
courts.188
The author of this opinion, Justice David Brewer, is an interesting
figure. He is known as among the most conservative of the “four
horsemen” on the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, in a
book entitled The United States as a Christian Nation, he wrote:
Certainly, to me it is the supreme conviction, growing stronger as
the years go by, that this one purpose of Providence in the life of
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this Republic, and that to this end we are to take from every race
its strongest and best elements and characteristics, and mold and
fuse them into one homogenous American life.189
Brewer thus appeared to hold certain integrationist tendencies. This view
should not be overstated, however, since he was also the author of the
majority opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky, upholding the
constitutionality of a Kentucky statute that prohibited integrated
education.190 Brewer noted that: "the right to teach white and negro
children in a private school at the same time and place is not a property
right. Besides, appellant as a corporation created by this State has no
natural right to teach at all. Its right to teach is such as the State sees fit
to give to it. The State may withhold it altogether, or qualify it.”191
An even more complex question is whether the same picture of
race neutrality or equal treatment also prevailed in the “mere presence”
cases following Falloon, all of which occurred during more racist
periods and often in the deep South. The outcomes of the cases are the
same: Worm, Kiersky, and Lancaster all denied white families’ requests
for injunctions preventing Blacks and other reviled groups from locating
in their neighborhoods.192 However, these cases do not similarly
celebrate the ideal of race neutrality or norms of racial equality. Worm
and Kiersky simply applied precedent without an extended discussion of
the norms underlying the precedent so appear unconcerned with
governing ideals.193
Lancaster is more difficult to categorize and requires more
extended analysis.194 The opinion belabors plaintiffs’ racist contentions
– particularly in contrast to Kiersky in which the court calls plaintiffs’
claims of race nuisance “mere surplusage.”195 In their legal analysis, the
judges go to some length to criticize the ideals of equal treatment, but in
the end, they follow them. The judges lament that precedent prevents
them from “following our own personal sentiments, which, as
individuals we are frank to admit, are wholly with the appellee.”196 The
judges then explain that “we as a court, must follow as our only guide,
the rules of law applicable alike to all, bearing in mind that the law is no
respecter of persons and was not made to apply to once caste to the
exclusion of another.”197 The judges end with the statement: “we feel
constrained to say that the record in this case discloses the inefficiency of
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the law to prevent all acts of injustice from being inflicted.”198 The
opinion is firmly rooted in legal positivism with its express delinking of
law and justice or morality. In addition, in one sense, the opinion can be
seen as affirming race neutrality in its suggestion that law cannot apply
differently to one group than another. On the other hand, by choosing to
express their affinity for the racist views of Mrs. Lancaster, the judges
are also sending a message of racial hostility and intolerance.
The cases following Falloon were decided in the “nadir” of race
relations in this country.199 Why did these judges not abandon the
precedent set in Falloon and find for the white plaintiffs who sought to
exclude Blacks from their midsts?200 We would expect the judges in the
more dramatically racist periods of the 1890s through the 1930s to have
rejected the norm of equal treatment exemplified in Falloon. The
opinions suggest that these judges were acting as reflexive formalists.201
D.

Formalism and Equal Treatment Reconsidered – Racial Zoning
and Restrictive Covenants

If the race nuisance can be explained through a combination of
nuisance doctrine and the ideal of equal treatment of the races under law,
this paper seems to present a much more egalitarian vision of law in the
Jim Crow era than one would ever have anticipated.202
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While race was certainly a factor in some of these cases and the
language and stereotypes that emerge are very troubling to a modern
reader, race did not uniformly dictate outcomes nor were judges blithely
ignoring the norm of equal treatment. However, this small set of cases
was only the first legal maneuver whites used to entrench racial
segregation and it cannot be considered in isolation. The next two
maneuvers are much beter known: racial zoning and the proliferation of
racially restrictive covenants.203 While both were ultimately held invalid
by the United States Supreme Court,204 the two practices fared better in
state courts. Many court decisions addressing racial zoning and racially
restrictive covenants both mangled precedent in predictably political
ways and were dramatically unsympathetic to the ideal of equal
treatment.
1.
Racial Zoning
White politicians introduced residential segregation zoning
ordinances beginning in 1910 in response to the influx of higher earning
Blacks to white neighborhoods.205 The purported purposes of the
ordinances were to “preserve social peace, protect racial purity, and
safeguard residential property values.”206 Methods to impose racial
housing segregation differed: some cities sought to keep each block
either all white or all Black by prohibiting anyone of a different race
from entering, others divided the municipality into distinct racial
districts, some limited new entrants to a particular block to the race of
the majority of current residents, and one, New Orleans, required new
residents of a particular race to obtain the consent of the current residents
if of a different race.207
These ordinances were very popular and spread quickly.
Between 1910 and 1916, they were enacted in Baltimore, several cities
in Virginia, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Greenville, North Carolina,
Atlanta, Louisville, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, and New Orleans.208
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Sadly, they were also very popular. St. Louis’ ordinance, for example,
was enacted by referendum by a margin of approximately three to one.209
Legal challenges to these ordinances met with mixed success.
Three states courts to consider the question, Maryland, Georgia, and
North Carolina, held that the segregation laws were unconstitutional,210
and two others, Virginia and Kentucky, found them constitutional.211
Both the Maryland and the Georgia courts ruled narrowly, however,
holding the local laws unconstitutional on the grounds that they applied
retroactively and limited the rights of current property owners to occupy
their property. In addition, the Georgia Supreme Court later held that a
racial zoning law was a reasonable exercise of the police power because
it would “prevent race friction, disorder, and violence.”212 Only the
North Carolina Court directly addressed the harm to Blacks from statemandated segregation.213
The North Carolina case was brought on appeal from the
conviction of William Darnell, a Black man, for purchasing a home for
his family in the “white” territory in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
The Court based its decision primarily upon whether the local
government was empowered by state enabling legislation to enact a
racial zoning ordinance. First, the Court mocked the board of alderman
by stating that to affirm the ordinance would create a precedent allowing
the board
to require: to live on certain streets and Democrats on others; or
Republicans
that Protestants shall reside only in certain parts of the town and
Catholics in another; or that Germans or people of German
descent should reside only where they are in the majority, and
that Irish and those of Irish descent should dwell only in certain
localities, designated for them by the arbitrary judgment
and permission of a majority of the aldermen.214
The Court then likened the ordinance to the residential prohibitions
upon the Irish and the Jews in Europe, and stated that: “We can hardly
believe that the Legislature by the ordinary words in a charter
authorizing the aldermen to "provide for the public welfare" intended to
initiate so revolutionary a public policy.”215
While this language suggests respect for the ideal of equal
treatment, the decision also sends more complex messages. Among the
reasons the Court provides for its skepticism that the legislature intended
to enable local governments to enact racial zoning ordinances is the
209
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state’s commitment to retaining Blacks as laborers in the state. The
Court concluded that this goal that would not be furthered by racial
zoning ordinances, explaining that similar ordinances in Ireland and
Eastern Europe prompted rapid emigration to the United States. This
discussion evinces a more material reason for the Court’s vehement
condemnation of racial zoning. In addition, the Court was deciding in a
post-Plessy era and thus the Court noted: “There is no question that
legislation can control social rights by forbidding intermarriage of the
races, and in requiring Jim Crow cars, and in similar matters.”216 The
Court differentiated racial zoning by appealing to the primacy of
property rights.
In Buchanan v. Warely, the Kentucky Supreme Court directly
addressed race as well with a different set of concerns than maintaining a
laboring class. The Court began its opinion by describing the problems
“caused by close association of races under congested conditions found
in modern municipalities.”217 The Court dismissed the concerns raised
by the North Carolina Court that upholding a racial zoning ordinance
would empower a local government to segregate by ethnicity or political
party as “time-worn sophistries” rejected by the Supreme Court in
Plessy.218 Rather, the Court evinced concern for the “racial integrity”
which it found was imperiled by “mere propinquity.”219 The Court
cloaked its opinion in supposed concern for the interests of Blacks by
endorsing Booker T. Washington’s notion of racial solidarity and group
uplift, and contended that the Black community would be better off if
middle class Blacks were required to stay in Black communities and
accept “the duties and responsibilities laid upon them by virtue of their
own success.”220 The Court took more seriously the concern for private
property rights relied upon by other state courts to invalidate racial
zoning, but ultimately, the Court accepted progressive era arguments in
support of government regulation to undercut the primacy of property
rights.221
Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Georgie Supreme Court
adopted the Buchanan reasoning and upheld the racial zoning ordinances
enacted in Richmond, Ashland, and Atlanta.222
However, these
decisions were overturned the following year in Buchanan v. Warely
when the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the Louisville
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ordinance as interfering with property rights in violation of the Due
Process Clause.223
The latter state court decisions addressing racial zoning were thus
strinkingly different from the “mere presence” race-nuisance cases. The
courts were willing to accept race as a ground to prevent property
ownership and to distinguish the role of race from ethnicity or party
membership. Unlike the Kansas Supreme Court in Falloon, these state
court decisions do not then follow the tenet of the Civil Rights Act.
Race was central to the outcome of the cases – an ordinance creating
Democratic and Republican, or Irish and Dutch blocks would have been
invalid, while an ordinance creating white and Blacks blocks was not.
The salience of race was also expressly communicated – not cloaked in
neutral rhetoric. The courts described the legislatures to be acting in the
inter ests of both whites and Blacks by keeping them separate, but the
centrality of race was considered completely legitimate.
2.
Racially Restrictive Covenants
The state courts in the restrictive covenant cases are equally
willing to allow race to impede property rights – and they mangle
property doctrine in blatantly result-oriented ways. This line of cases is
perhaps even more relevant to thinking about the race-nuisance cases
because both involve attempts by white homeowners (rather than local
government) to use legal mechanisms to enforce segregation. As
property scholars have long recognized outside the context of race,
covenants are private attempts to pre-empt disfavored land uses and
became widespread early in the twentieth century.224 In contrast to the
race-nuisance cases, which the small number of reported cases suggests
were fairly rare, racially restrictive covenants became quite common
during the early 20th century and bear significant responsibility for the
entrenched housing discriminating that continues to exist.225
Unlike the relatively uniform outcome in the race-nuisance cases,
there were significant jurisdictional splits in state courts concerning the
enforceability of racially restrictive covenants. Most of these cases were
brought during the same time period as the race-nuisance cases -- the
early 20th century up until 1948 when the Supreme Court held such
covenants unenforceable under the Equal Protection Clause.226 During
223
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this time, no state court held that the racially estrictive covenants were
invalid on public policy grounds despite the link between race and rights
to property. Only five courts, in California, Michigan, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, concluded that racially restrictive covenants
were invalid restraints on alienation. And these cases were pyrrhic
victories. With the exception of a lower court in Pennsylvania in
1946,227 even those jurisdictions that found racial restrictions on sales
invalid as restraints upon alienation upheld racial restrictions upon
occupancy.228
In an illustrative case decided in 1919, the California Supreme
Court reasoned that a deed restriction on occupancy “is not a restraint
upon alienation, but upon the use of the property.”229 The court
continued: “ There is no prohibition of such restraints imosed by way of
condition nor was there any at common law.”230 In a more searching
opinion involving an occupancy restriction at the Monroe Avenue
Church of Christ, the Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld the validity of a
restriction against occupancy by Negroes and affirmed an injunction to
evict a Black pastor from the church.231 The court first noted that outside
of the context of race, use restrictions against liquor, building
requirements and the like are quite common. With regard to restrictions
against occupancy by a class of persons the court stated:
Comparisons are odious; none are intended.
Only for the
purpose of developing that which is glaringly obvious, we
inquire: Would any one gainsay that one allotting and selling
property . . . might . . . write into conveyances . . . a restrictive
covenant against letting a property therein to be occupied and
used as a house of prostitution? The absurdity of an affirmative
answer negates the question. Yet even prostitutes are a class of
our citizenry. If one class may by contract be denied the
privilege of use and occupancy, why not another? White may
exclude black. Black may exclude white.232
The fallacy of the distinction between alienation and occupancy is quite
plain. As Judge McDade of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
argued:
“the distinction between restrictions on alienation and
restrictions on occupancy certainly appear to be highly artificial and
illogical, for as a practical matter, if a man not of the white race may not
occupy land, obviously he cannot for economic reasons buy the
same.”233
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Contemporaneous commentators noticed and described the
courts’ deviance from accepted applications of the legal rule prohibiting
restraints on alienation. Professor Arthur Martin wrote in 1934 that,
while there was some jurisdictional divergence in race-neutral covenant
cases, “there is more than a lack of harmony in the results of the
application of this Rule to race segregation cases; there is a failure to
recognize the general purpose which justifies the existence of the
Rule.”234 In a book entitled, The Legal Status of the Negro, originally
published in 1940, Professor Charles Magnum writes that:
The state’s attitude toward restraints on alienation in general
would no doubt influence the court in its consideration of the
problem, but even this might not be allowed to interfere where
there was an ingrained prejudice on way or the other. This is
illustrated by the fact that the southern states have uniformly
upheld such covenants whenever the question has been
235
presented.
The
doctrinal
manipulation and utter disavowal of the norm of
equal treatment in the restrictive covenant cases – and in several of the
racial zoning cases – undercuts any conclusion that formalism and the
ideal of equal treatment alone explain the outcomes of the race-nuisance
cases.
E.

Interest Convergence: Race Nuisance and Segregation

Critical race theory offers a possible explanation for the different
treatment of race nuisance and racial zoning and covenant cases: interest
convergence.236 Derrick Bell is best known for this theory and has
articulated: "The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." 237
If a primary goal of the Jim Crow period was racial segregation,238 then
perhaps courts were rarely willing to find for individual white plaintiffs
in the race nuisance cases because very few of the race-nuisance cases
challenged the architecture of segregation. Rather, most of the cases
involved white challenges to the location of all-Black institutions.239
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Another set of cases involved wealthy white families seeking to house
their Black servants on their property.240 Only a small subset of the
cases involved the potential integration of racial minorities as equals into
white neighborhoods.241
For a racially segregated society to exist, Black institutions had to
be located somewhere, and the small Black enclaves may not have been
big enough for cemeteries, hospitals, parks and sanatoriums. Therefore,
the decisions to reject claims that all-Black institutions constituted a
nuisance may have been consistent with the general societal goal of
segregation. This conclusion has some support in other reported cases in
which individual or small groups of white landowners tried to challenge
zoning decisions or the use of municipal funds for Black cemeteries,
parks and schools. In each, courts rejected the claims of the individual
white landowners in favor of the broader societal interest of a segregated
society.242
Several of the cases did seem contrary to the goal of segregation,
however. Falloon, Lancaster, and Woods v. Kiersky all involved suits
seeking to prevent Blacks from living in white neighborhoods. These
can perhaps be explained by altering slightly the articulation of the white
interests at stake. Perhaps segregation per se was not the primary goal of
Jim Crow, but rather, racial subordination or white dominance. Though
the presence of Black servants obviously offended the particular
neighbors in Lancaster and Woods v. Kiersky, this sort of racial
proximity did not challenge the societal goal of racial subordination or
some descriptons of the general interests of the dominant class.
Generally, even those hostile to living near blacks made exceptions for
Black servants since “it had always been a central tenet of white racist
ideology that . . . whenever the two races come into contact, the white
man must rule, and the black man must serve.”243 According to a white
Missippian and former slaveowner, whites had no objection to personal
association with Blacks, “provided it be upon terms which contain no
suggestion of equality of personal status.”244
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Allowing for a broad definition of white interest, the vast
major ity of the race-nuisance cases did not actually challenge the
dominant racial mores of the times. Rather, all but five cases were either
consistent with the goal of establishing a segregated society or with
maintaining the role of African Americans as a servant class. Only
Qualls II, Falloon, Hollbrook, Worm v. Wood, and Redmond involved
the potential for the integeration of racial minorities as relative equals.
Indeed, one can argue that even Falloon and Worm did not truly
challenge racial supremecy. In both cases, Blacks and other racial
minorities were to be housed in small shacks in what seem to be more
prosperous white neighborhoods. Arguably then, these cases involved
proximity but not equality since the shacks did not connote that the
residents were the equals of the neighboring whites.
This theory has some traction: unlike the racial zoning and
restrictive covenant cases, race nuisance cases did not further segregation
in any coherent way and therefore, courts were able to give lip-service to
applying doctrine fairly and adhering to egalitarian norms. While courts
perceiving value in the appearance of even-handedness is still perhaps
surprising to those who previously adhered to the “pawn” view of state
courts, it does not undercut the interest convergence take. This argument
is similar to Berry’s analysis of the inheritance cases. She contends that:
Judges let African American mistresses and their children inherit
according to the provisions of a white patriarch’s will because
their claims reinforced rather than threatened male domination
and race relations.245
The primary limitation of the interest convergence take, in my
view, is that it is most helpful as an ex post explanation for the outcomes
of cases rather than for predicting how courts will rule ex ante. In both
the race-nuisance cases and the inheritance cases, either conclusion the
courts reached can be explained as supporting racist norms.
In addition, as noted above, a few of the race-nuisance cases
would seem contrary to dominant white interests. Mr. Qualls, described
as a highly successful funeral home director, brought two separate
actions to overturn zoning decisions by the City of Memphsis seeking
entry into what the courts describe as an affluent part of town.246 Mr.
Qualls and his lawyers expressly challenged the zoning decisions as
racist actions, seeking to have the decisions overturned as violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that Mr. Qualls succeeded in his
second action, and that the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that he
should be allowed to operate his casket business and live in an affluent
white part of Memphsis would be difficult to predict using an interest
convergence analysis.
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Redmond is perhaps even more quixotic. The suit was brought in
Mississippi in 1928 and involved a Black man administering drugs and
medicine to both Blacks and whites, including white women. The case
raised all the specters of white paranoia – and it would seem in the
inter ests of white doctors to preclude Blacks from administering
medicine without a license. Yet the Court refused to issue an injunction
prohibiting him from operating.
In addition, interest convergence seems to assume that white
interests are monolithic and that racialized interests supercede all other
interests or principles. These assumptions are disproved even in the
small world of cases this essay considers. The preferences of whites
often diverged from racist norms: in Worm v. Wood, it was in the
landowner’s interest to be able to have wide access to potential tenants of
whatever race; the white patients of Mr. Redmond preferred his medical
treatment to other available white doctors. Similarly, the white real
estate broker plaintiff in Buchanan v. Warely like the defendant in Worm
v. Wood inveighed against a racially restricted client base, and indeed the
white owners of the railroad that colluded in Plessy v. Ferguson had
financial reasons to prefer an end to segregated rail cars. While the
majority of white voters sadly were supportive of racial zoning – many
white financial interests were harmed by these same mechanisms.
1.
Protecting the Rights of White Property Owners
Perhaps then the interest convergence theory need only be
amended to add the primacy of property rights. Many commentators
have contended that the importance of property rights has historically
transcended even support for segregation.247 This principle seems to
explain the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the racial zoning
ordinance in Buchanan v. Warely. Even the Supreme Court’s “notorious
racist,”248 Justice James McReynolds, joined the opinion. The primacy
of property rights was evident in the first set of southern courts cases
invalidating racial zoning ordinances.249 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, for example, appeared moved not as much by constitutional
concerns, as the “inalienable right to own, acquire, and dispose of
property, which is not conferred by the Constitution, but exists of natural
right.”250
Justice Brewer, for example, whom I noted above may have
harbored integrationist views, is better known as a strong proponent of
property rights.251 In a speech at Yale Law School, he described the
“sacredness” of property ownership and the “love of acquirement,
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mingled with the joy of possession.”252 The “natural-law/natural-rights”
theory of property that Brewer and others of his time likely adhered to
extolled the notion of man’s “equal freedom of action” over his land.253
This theory provides a powerful protection for individual’s rights to use
their property – unless that use results in a physical invasion of another’s
property.254
This natural right theory of property which included the rights to
use and transfer as widely as possible may even have trumped the racism
of the period. According to a contemporaneous scholar, the main
concern animating courts during this period was protecting the ability of
white property owners to sell their property:
Courts have in many instances diverged from their usual policy
of upholding the separatists. In abandoning their customary
attitude toward policies of like nature, the courts have probably
been influenced by the fact that white property owners would
otherwise be limited in their ability to transfer their property.255
This view also correlates with the outcomes in the race-nuisance
cases. Seven of the eight “mere presence” cases involved disputes
between white landowners.256 Ten of the cases clearly involved white
property owners on both sides of the dispute.257 In another elevent of the
cases, it is not clear whether the property owner of the challenged land
use was white or Black.258 In only seven of the cases was the property
owner or owners of the challenged use definitely Black.259 Though it
must be noted that of the six cases in which the property owner was
Black, in all but one, the Black property owner prevailed.
The principle of protecting property owners from external
intrusion helps distinguish between the race-nuisance and restrictive
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covenant cases. The latter involve a property owner’s desire to impose
restrictions upon his own property into the future while the former
involves interference by purely external forces.260 As Eric Claeyes has
recently detailed, nineteenth century property theorists were loath to
allow law to dictate how an individual used his land: “many are the
degrees, many are the varieties of human genius, human dispositions,
and human characters. One man has a turn for mechanicks; another for
architecture; one paints; a second makes poems; this excels in the arts of
a military; the other, in those of civil life. To account for these varieties
of taste and character is not easy, is, perhaps impossible.”261
Accordingly, for judges to determine that Blacks constituted a per se
nuisance was a significant deviation from the court’s general protection
of individual property owners’ preferences. By contrast, the restrictive
covenant cases involved property owner’s attempts to control their own
property through contract law.
Many scholars have suggested that the line of cases during the
Jim Crow and Progressive eras that protected property rights even when
such protections mitigated against racial segregation were somehow less
important to the pursuit of equal justice for people of color.262 Protecting
property rights alone is obviously not sufficient when it is not
accompanied by access to education, employment, capital, and evenhanded application of criminal laws. However, race neutral protection of
property rights was a critical step in the movement toward civil rights in
this country. If the protection of private property is a central function of
government in a capitalist society, the failure to protect the property of
one class of citizens would have been significant indeed.263 More
specifically, court decisions invalidating the property rights of Black
people on grounds that their presence was offensive could well have led
to a juridical apartheid. As other commentators have argued, the
protection of property rights illustrated Jim Crow’s legal limits.264 The
race nuisance cases, then, along with the Supreme Court’s decisions
invalidating racial zoning and finally holding racially restrictive
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Struggle for Racial Equality, 114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004).
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covenants unenforceable were of enormous importance in the the 20th
century’s civil rights struggle.265
IV.

RACE NUISANCE
THE PRESENT

AND

RACIAL LIBERATION -- INSIGHTS

INTO

One response to the race nuisance cases is: So what? If in most
areas of law, state courts in the Jim Crow era did ignore the legal rights
of Black people, why does this small set of cases matter in the big
picture? I contend that these cases – and likely a host of others -- matter
for multiple reasons, both intellectual and practical.
First, mischaracterizing the state courts’ jurisprudential practices
leads scholars to misinterpret the Supreme Court’s practices. Scholars
such as David Bernstein and Sonia Somin have described the Supreme
Court’s race decisions, and particularly Buchanan, during the
Progressive era as remarkable. They emphasize the significance of a
decision invalidating racial zoning during the most racist period in postCivil War American history, and the facts that (1) the Court had to
distinguish Plessy and “was not entirely persuasive in doing so:”; (2)
during this period, sociological jurisprudence were in the ascendance;
and (3) the Supreme Court had recently upheld nonracial zoning, on
grounds that could as easily been applied to racial zoning. However,
Buchanan is not nearly so remarkable if viewed in light of the race
nuisance cases. The Supreme Court should not be given credit for
progressive racial views if state courts during the same era were adhering
to similar ideals. Our intellectual history of the Supreme Court will
necessarily be incomplete and misinformed if we ignore the backdrop of
state court decisions against which the Court acted.
Conversely, the cases are also provide insight into the limits of
race neutrality. The last race-nuisance case, Wright v. DeFatta, was
decided in 1962. In that case, white plaintiffs were successful in seeking
an injunction prohibiting the construction of “an excessive number of
Negro dwellings contrary to the Municipal Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance.”266 The date of that case is perhaps not surprising – by the
1960s, racism was at the beginning of its retreat to the shadows of human
behavior. However, as we know, the legal mandate against explicit
racism did not result in its demise.
Racial zoning may have been invalidated during the Progressive
era, but as many have detailed, myriad race-neutral laws have
265

Id. Bernstein & Somin quote W.E.B. Du Bois as crediting Buchanan with "the
breaking of the backbone of segregation." Id. at 633-34. The late Judge Leon
Higginbotham argued that "Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake
to decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States." (quoted in
Bernstein & Somin, supra note __, n254).
266 142 So.2d 489.

48

nonetheless been applied to create a segregated and unequal society.267
Indeed, without expressly referencing “race,” some have argued,
governments used zoning intentionally to permit the intrusion of
incompatible uses into Black neighborhoods and destroy the quality of
life.268 These schemes zoned low income residential areas occupied
primarily by Blacks for industrial or commercial use.269 Because other
areas of a municipality prohibit such uses, industrial developers would
locate in the Black neighborhoods – bringing with them the noise, odors,
and pollution that zoning was ostensibly intended to eliminate. Yale
Rabin named this practice “expulsive zoning” because it had the effect of
expelling Black residents from their homes.270 However, he contends
that many Blacks were unable to leave these neighborhoods even after
industry intruded because of housing discrimination elsewhere.271 The
combination of expulsive zoning and housing discrimination led Black
comunities in urban areas to become blighted and overcrowded.272
Many local governments also used their zoning power to prevent the
poor from moving to newly established suburbs or to middle and upper
income neighborhoods which had the effect of segregating the poor –
and often people of color -- within cities.273 Arguably, then, zoning has
had dire effects upon people of color without violating the legal formalist
impediment of race neutrality.
White plaintiffs’ lack of success in classifying Black people as
nuisances per se has not rendered nuisance law wholly free from racial
effects either. Beginning in the Jim Crow era and continuing into the
late 20th century, local officials have used their authority to eliminate
public nuisances to enact various race neutral vagrancy, anti-loitering,
and most recently, anti-gang statutes that have had a vastly
disproportionate impact upon people of color.274 As Dorothy Roberts
See, e.g., Godsil, supra note __.
YALE RABIN, EXPULSIVE ZONING: THE INEQUITABLE LEGACY OF EUCLID, IN
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Rabin undertook 12 case studies to determine why Black residential areas were often
interspersed with industrial and commercial uses. Id. at 102. In each, he found that
expulsive zoning was a major influence. Id.
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and other scholars have argued, these ostensibly race neutral statutes
were often by design or effect focused upon criminalizing and excluding
African Americans from public spaces.275 When the exclusionary
intention or effect has been too obvious, the Supreme Court has often
intervened even if on grounds other than the Equal Protection Clause.
For example, in the 1970s, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the
Supreme Court invalidated as vague an anti-loitering law, holding:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to
comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by
the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no
standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the
ordinance, the scheme ... furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."276
And more recently, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme
Court invalidated a loitering ordinance enacted in Chicago which
allowed police officers to order any group of two or more people to
disperse if one is a suspected gang member and to arrest and imprison
anyone who refused.277 The anti-loitering ordinance was race neutral,
and race was not a basis for the Court’s decision. However, as Roberts
reported: “[d]uring the three years the law was in effect, it yielded
arrests of more than 40,000 citizens, most of whom were Black or Latino
residents of inner-city neighborhoods.”278 Most interesting, perhaps, is
the debate as to whether people of color were ultimately helped or
harmed by the Supreme Court’s decision.279
In most facets of our society -- education, incarcertain rates,
earnings, capitol, life expectancy, infant mortality, access to health care,
quality of environment – race remains a salient fact. In some of these,
law itself remains a barrier to equality. In this Article, I have suggested
that the race neutrality ideal present in the race nuisance cases was a
was a member of the gang were so broad that most young African-American and Latino
men satisfied one or more of the criteria. Id. See also Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes
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critical turn away from legalized apartheid, but I also recognize that it
has never been sufficient to overcome the use of law to achieve
racialized ends by some segments of society.
Apart from intellectual history, the cases’ practical significance
were primarily a negative: contary decisions in these cases -- Black
people as a matter of law are a nuisance – would have signaled a turn
toward a dramatically worse society. However, the cases yield several
more nuanced insights that are useful in thinking through the current
pursuit of racial liberation and equal justice.
The first insight is that those seeking to protect the interests of
disempowered group should be willing to seek such protection in longheld common law precedents rather than focusing exclusively upon
contested provisions of the Constitution or the civil rights regulatory
framework.280 Long before the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v.
Ferguson, southern state courts were at least in some instances
recognizing the norm of race neutrality in applying common law legal
doctrines. The reflexive formalism found in the race nuisance cases is
likely similarly to be triggered by strategies linked to property and
contract law.281 Judges may well be more protective of common law
legal doctrines because they presume they will apply as well to white
litigants. A variant of this argument has been waged by scholars seeking
to understand
Buchanan.
The insight
that those seeking racial justice should utilize
doctrines that apply more generally leads to the second insight: the cases
remind us of the utility of interest convergence or as I’d prefer to call it
“strategic alliances.”282 I must begin by acknowledging that Derrick
Bell himself is deeply skeptical that interest convergence will lead to any
true eradication of racism.283 Bell has stated: “Beyond the ebb and flow
of racial progress lies the still viable and widely accepted (though
seldom expressed) belief that America is a white country in which
blacks, particularly as a group, are not entitled to the concern, resources,
or even empathy that would be extended to similarly situated whites.”284
Others have more hope. Sherryl Cashin in a recent piece reflects
upon the role of “coalition politics” in the civil rights revolution, and
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seeks to harness interest convergence “to build the sustainable
multiracial coalitions that will be necessary if we are to close existing
gaps of racial inequality.”285 Indeed, Cashin quotes Bell for the
proposition that alliances can be beneficial:
Despite its limited benefit, those who defended the University of
Michigan affirmative action plans utilized diversity as a self-interest
strategy planned for in advance rather than a happy coincidence
recognized in retrospect. n80
This tradition has a long vintage, of course. As noted above, Plessy
itself, while unsuccessful, was based upon the joint interest of African
Americans and the railroads who found the segregation laws expensive
and inexedient.286 Buchanan also involved a strategic alliance between
African Americans in Baltimore and a white real estate magnate who
sought the freedom to sell to people of whatever race.287
I would also argue that organizing across race is not and should
not always be based upon the perceived convergence of economic
inter ests of people of color and the dominant class of whites. White
interests, like the interests of people of color, are not monolithic. Class,
gender, occupation, geography, political belief system – all are bases
upon which particular groups of people may have more in common with
particular groups of people of other races and ethnicities than with
others of their own race. 288
While a full exploration of this theme is beyond the scope of this
article, and some will undoubtedly criticize my naivite, it has been my
own experience in engaging in multi-racial coalitions in the
environmental justice context that strategic alliances or interest
convergence remind us that we share common humanity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The race nuisance cases are fascinating pieces of history. What
remains unanswered from the appellate opinions alone, however, is
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whether the unsuccessful white plaintiffs honored the decisions denying
them relief or whether they pursued extra-legal means. Was Mr.
Redmond run out of town after the decision was rendered? Did John
Falloon respond violently to the preacher and his family? Were the
houses ever constructed for the prospective Black, Mexican, and poor
white tenants from Texas? How did the tenacious Mr. Qualls fare? As
always, the opinions were only the penultimate step, the real story lies in
the implementation.
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